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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 44910 
     ) 
vs.     ) Ada County No. CR-FE-2016-5900 
     ) 
SHANE MICHAEL STORER, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 Has Storer failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion 
when it imposed and executed concurrent sentences of 10 years with one year 




Storer Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Police first attempted to stop Shane Michael Storer’s car near Capitol and Front, 
in downtown Boise.  (R., pp. 156, 159.1)  Storer eluded the officer by driving at speeds 
                                            
1 Page number references are to the electronic copy of the PSI, which does not always 
match the bates-stamp page numbers.   
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of 80 to 90 M.P.H. and running three red lights, heading toward the I-84 Connector.  
(PSI, p. 156.)  Storer continued on I-84, where he reached speeds in excess of 100 
M.P.H.  (PSI, p. 121.)   Storer, at speeds still around 100 M.P.H., took the west-bound 
Eagle Road off-ramp, ran another red light at Eagle Road, nearly striking a car, then re-
entered the freeway on the west-bound Eagle Road on-ramp.  (PSI, pp. 121-22, 125.)  
Officers again re-engaged in the pursuit, but again Storer eluded them for a while by 
traveling at 110 to 115 M.P.H. or more.  (PSI, pp. 122-23, 123, 126, 140.)  Storer exited 
I-84 on the Meridian Road off-ramp, still at very high speeds, and rear-ended a car, 
driven by Stefanie Jafek, that was stopped at the light.  (PSI, pp. 118, 126, 136, 140-41, 
163-64, 304.)  The collision broke Stephanie’s clavicle and a rib, and she was taken to 
the hospital.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Storer drove away from the accident, until the damage done 
to his car eventually disabled it.  (PSI, pp. 3, 28, 123, 126-27.)  When emergency 
personnel responded to his location, Storer became verbally abusive, threatening to kill 
the police officers and paramedics.  (PSI, p. 118.)  Storer had consumed large amounts 
of alcohol and marijuana and likely also used a hallucinogenic or other drug.  (PSI, pp. 
3-4, 202, 305, 308.) 
 The state charged Storer with aggravated DUI, leaving the scene of an injury 
accident, eluding, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., 
pp. 37-39, 49-51.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Storer pled guilty to aggravated DUI 
and eluding, and the state dismissed the additional charges.  (R., pp. 71-80.)  The 
district court imposed and executed concurrent sentences of 10 years with one year 
fixed for aggravated DUI and five years indeterminate for eluding.  (R., pp. 82, 86.)  The 
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district court suspended Storer’s driving privileges for eight years with four years 
absolute suspension.  (R., pp. 82, 86.)   
Storer filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 85, 90.)  On appeal Storer claims 
the district court abused its sentencing discretion by executing the sentences.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-19.)  Review of the record shows no abuse of discretion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) 
(citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  Whether to grant 
probation “is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4).   
 
C. Storer Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must 
establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  To establish that the 
sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not 
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
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protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 
170 P.3d at 401.  In determining whether the appellant met his burden, the court 
considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is 
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion 
will be the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 
387, 391 (2007). 
 At sentencing the district court applied the correct legal standards.  (Tr., p. 44, L. 
24 - p. 45, L. 12.)  It considered the relevant factors and the arguments and 
recommendations of the parties.  (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 13-20.)  It found the following mitigating 
factors: Storer’s good background, lack of significant criminal history, acceptance of 
responsibility, initiative in getting into treatment, stable home, education, amenability to 
rehabilitation, low LSI score, and gainful employment.  (Tr., p. 45, L. 21 – p. 46, L. 20.)  
In aggravation it found that the crime involved a “very serious violent collision” and 
“serious personal injuries to an innocent victim”; that Storer’s behavior could have 
resulted in a death and “put many people in the public at risk”; and that Storer’s “serious 
alcohol issues” had resulted in bad behavior and detriment to his life previously.  (Tr., p. 
46, L. 21 – p. 47, L. 3.)  The district court rejected retained jurisdiction as appropriate in 
this case.  (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 4-13.)  In deciding whether probation or an executed sentence 
were appropriate the court reasoned that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating ones, and executing concurrent sentences of 10 years with one year fixed for 
aggravated DUI and five years indeterminate for eluding was necessary for “both 
specific and general deterrent purposes.”  (Tr., p. 47, L. 14 – p. 49, L. 4.)  “Ultimately in 
my mind it comes down to fashioning a sentence that fits the crime and I don’t think that 
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it would be proper to impose a sentence for the seriousness of this event that would 
allow one to get out on probation even with jail time.”  (Tr., p. 49, Ls. 5-9.)  The district 
court’s analysis shows an appropriate exercise of discretion, not an abuse thereof. 
 Storer argues the district court abused its discretion based on “two facts of 
primary significance that interweave through all the sentencing factors and 
considerations.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  “First, both the PSR and highly respected 
experts recommended a sentence of probation ….”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)  The 
problem with this argument is that such recommendations are “in no way binding upon 
the court.”  State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1990).  
See also State v. Saunders, 124 Idaho 334, 338, 859 P.2d 370, 374 (Ct. App. 1993) (“a 
trial judge is free to follow or to reject a presentence investigator's recommendation”); 
State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 324, 824 P.2d 894, 899 (Ct. App. 1991). “Second, Mr. 
Storer’s criminal conduct is inextricably and directly linked to his struggles with the 
illness of alcohol addiction ….”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  However, a court does not 
abuse its discretion when it considers evidence of alcohol abuse but concludes it does 
not mandate a lesser sentence.  State v. Bradac, 101 Idaho 240, 240-41, 611 P.2d 
1025, 1025-26 (1980); State v. Cowger, 111 Idaho 825, 826-27, 727 P.2d 1253, 1254-
55 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 799-800, 891 P.2d 1054, 1059-60 
(Ct. App. 1995).  The district court considered and weighed all of the mitigating factors 
discussed by Storer on appeal.  (Compare Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7 with Tr., p. 45, L. 
21 – p. 46, L. 20.)  That Storer wishes they had been given different weight does not 
show an abuse of discretion. 
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 Storer faults the district court for considering the potential harm of his actions as 
an aggravating circumstance.   (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8 (“To the extent the court 
actually relied on speculative, potential harm that did not occur in sentencing Mr. Storer, 
such reliance was inappropriate.”).)  The cases he cites are from other jurisdictions, and 
are of limited value.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  In Idaho, it is appropriate to consider in 
sentencing the “potential harm” caused by a defendant’s crimes.  State v. Marsh, 141 
Idaho 862, 869, 119 P.3d 637, 644 (Ct. App. 2004) (district court considered “the 
potential harm” of the defendant’s actions); State v. Monroe, 128 Idaho 676, 681, 917 
P.2d 1316, 1321 (Ct. App. 1996) (“the district court recognized that the potential for 
serious harm, given Monroe's history, was great, although this was a case in which the 
victim escaped serious harm”); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 108, 822 P.2d 998, 
1005 (Ct. App. 1991) (“The judge pointed out that, while it is true that no individuals 
were injured during the attempted escape, the potential for harm was significant.”).  
Indeed, that the “defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm” is 
among the specific statutory factors a court must weigh in favor of probation over 
incarceration.  I.C. § 19-2501(2)(a).  It was far from speculative for the judge to 
conclude that Storer’s reckless and extreme actions put lives at risk, and this made his 
crimes more serious than if the danger had not been so great. 
 Storer also argues that the district court’s analysis in rejecting a retained 
jurisdiction, which he characterizes as “reject[ing] a lesser sentence as unnecessary 
due to a defendant’s exemplary and substantial progress,” “defies reason.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 10.)  However, “[t]he primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to 
enable the trial court to gain additional information regarding the defendant's 
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rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation.”  State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915, 
120 P.3d 299, 303 (Ct. App. 2005).  See also State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 161, 
244 P.3d 1244, 1247 (2010) abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) (““The purpose of this period of 
retained jurisdiction is to provide an evaluation ‘of the offender's potential for 
rehabilitation and suitability for probation.’”) (quoting State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 
240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004)).  The district court’s determination that it did 
not need additional information regarding Storer’s rehabilitative potential and suitability 
for probation was an eminently reasonable reason to reject retaining jurisdiction. 
 Storer also derides the district court for “the editorial nature of its descriptions” of 
his crimes.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  He identifies only one comment as having an 
“editorial tone,” however; the characterization of “Mr. Storer’s failure to yield at a red 
light as ‘blast[ing] through the red light.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 17 (brackets original, 
quoting Tr., p. 5, Ls. 3-4).)  Storer, however, has not presented a viable claim of error 
because he has provided neither law nor argument how the district court’s choice of 
words describing Storer’s conduct of going through a red light at about 100 M.P.H. was 
in any way improper.  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a 
party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking).  If this issue 
is presented, Storer’s description of his conduct (“failure to yield”) is far less accurate 
than the district court’s. 
 The district court applied the correct legal standards, reached findings of fact 
unchallenged on appeal, and weighed aggravating and mitigating factors in coming up 
with a sentence well within its discretion given the nature of the crimes in this case.  
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Storer argues the weighing should have reached a different conclusion, but has failed 
to show that the sentence is unreasonable.  He has therefore failed to show an abuse 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 




        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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